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The history of South America is fiIled

5h'l;

with turmoil

and upheaval. Riots, revolutions, and bl-oodshed can be

found in almost every country on the continent if one were

to look hard enough.

Some

think that this kind of radical-

opposition to forms of government is a thing of the past,

but one need look no further than Peru for proof that
contradicts such a belief. The Sendero Luminoso r or the
Shining Path, is an extremist militant group that has

made

their presence known through their actions, and has l-eft
wave

of simul-taneous fear and fascination in their

a

wake.

While the Peruvian government assures its citizens that the

terrorism is a problem that is being dealt with, an even
biqger problem remains; one that enables the Shining Path

to keep on shining. The issue of poverty and the
government's continued position of overlooking the
downtrodden has al-Iowed the Shining Path to gain power, and

until the issue is deal-t with, the Shining Path wil-l- never
be

dimmed.

The Shining Path was born in 1,970 in the remote

l-ocation of Ayacucho, high in the Peruvian Andes. Ayacucho
was, and still

is, one of the more impoverished sectors of

Peru.1 Partially because of its location, and also because

of its l-ack of resources, the Peruvian government

had

ignored Ayacucho long before Abimael Guzman founded the

Shining Path. Wh1le a philosophy professor at the

University of

Huamanga, Abimael Guzman

first developed his

ideas for the Shining Path after studying the writings of
China's communist leader, Mao Zedong. Guzman, who also

by the

name Comrade

Gonzalo, was a fiery communist

qoes

who

bel-ieved that there should be an abol-ition of "the nati-onalmarket economy, industry, the banking system, all- foreign

trade, the use of currency, and the establishment of
communal

barter

village-oriented

exchange. "2 Guzman

economy based on

a

a system of

eventually l-eft his university

and

began to recruit young fol-Iowers for his new radical

organization.
Guzman's

first recruits were mostly young and poor

Indians. These were easy targets for the Shining Path,
since many of 1ikely had nothing else in their lives.

Initially

the Shining Path seemed like another radical-

I Rapoport, David C. Inside Eerrorist Organizations.
University Press, 1988), 109.
2 Rapoport, 113.

(New

York:

Columbj-a

protesting group that. would do no harm, except speak out
against the Peruvj-an government. Then, in !978, the group
disappeared, and many Peruvians bel-ieved that the cul-t had

simply dissolved.3 However, the Shining Path had just

gone

into hiding in order to plan their first violent attack.
In l-980, the Shining Path strung together a series of
attacks on polling places in Ayacucho during the
presidential election.a These

woul-d be

the first

documented

attacks by the group, and by 1985, the Shining Path would
be directly responsible for carrying out a total- of 6,158
documented

attacks against the Peruvian government.s During

this time, only twice did the Shining Path j-ssue any
wri-tten documents (once in l-981 and again in t982) that
explained who they were and what they wanted. Generally

organizations of this type are more concerned about getting
as much information public as possible, but the Shining
Path belj-eve in the concept of "propaganda by the deed, " or

actions speaking louder than words.6
From 1980

until- L992, Abimael

Guzman

and the Shining

Path organized violent assaults against the Peruvian
government, recruiting members when they could, and killing

others when they created probJ-ems.
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Guzman was

finally

arrested in 1,992, while doing extensive bombings in Lima,

the country's capital, and sentenced to life in pri-son.
When

he was interviewed, Guzman said that the Shining Path

was on the brink of victory, and that the Shining Path's

ideoJ-ogy, Gonzal-o Thought, was neari-ng the titl-e of

Gonzalism, a belief that included genocide.T Al-though their
l-eader was behind bars, members of the Shining Path

continued to wreak havoc. AJ-though the Shining Path is less

prevalent than j-t was in the 1980's, it stiIl

remains

responslble for bombings and attacks in Peru today.

In order to understand why the Shining Path has been
able to l-ast for more than three decades, it is imperative

to look at their bel-iefs and members, and why so many
continue to join. The majority of the members of the
Shining Path are of the lower class. But that does not

that just because

someone i-s

mean

poor, they are more 1ike1y to

join in a revol-ution or a violent, radica1 organlzation.
Many scholars do argue, however, that. peasants

will

"consider rebellion when they judge their right to
subsistence to be serj-ousl-y threatened."E In the case of
Ayacucho, the malority of the population was poor, and
7 *still
Shini-ng After Al-1 These Years." The Economist. Vol 373 Issue
8399 (1-0/30/200a) z 44.
8 Mario Eumerton. "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant
Self-defence organisations 1n Ayacucho." BuJ-Letin of Latin American
Research. VoI 20 Issue 4 (Oct2001): 412.

Abimael Guzman preyed upon their fear and jealousy of the

upper class. He painted the qovernment as a greedy and

uncaring entity that worried only about the upper crust of

society. In a sense, he was proven right, when in the mid70's, the Peruvj-an government began ignoring l-abor and
peasant orqanizations, and giving preference to business
owners and foreign i-nvestors. At the same time, the

national debt began to rise, and to counteract the negative
effect the government cut urban workers' benefits, ds wellas their rj-ghts.e Sometimes, after the Shining Path had
passed through a particular town, the Peruvian military

would appear in the town and kiII innocent peasants for

withholding
Guzman

j-nf

ormation.lo

The

government itself

was helping

recruit followers.

The Shining Path was able to keep recruj-ts because of

what is cal-led the leader-foll-ower relationship. These

relationships j-ncl-ude four properties: the group leader is
believed to possess unj-que vision and superhuman qualities,

the group leader's views and beliefs are unquestionably
accepted, the group l-eaders orders and carried out also

without query, and the l-eader is given unqualified support
e Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational
Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso. "
Terrorism & PoTiticaL VioLence. VoI 14 Issue 4 (Winter2002): 70-7L.
r0 *shining bloodstained path. " New Internationafist.
Issue 321
(Mar2000) : 19.

and devot j-on.11 These quallties are ideal- f or a group like

the Shining Path that belj-eves that they are

beingr

persecuted or ignored and left to die. A charismatic leader
can

appeal to someone who is struggling, and who is in need

of guidance.
The Shining Path al-so initially
sympathi-es

appealed to the

of those who did not want to join, but

who were

questioning the role of government, or who simply felt

sorry for those who were so unfortunate.

Members were abl-e

to pass through towns in Peru without fear of being
over to the poJ-ice, and sometimes the Shining Path

repaid

some

handed

even

poorer towns with goods that they had taken

from their assaul,ts.12 They also did some grassroots
organiz:-ng in their early stages, including setting

up

literacy programs 1n poor Indian vilJ-ages, and preaching
non-violent protest.13
Althouqh the Shining Path itself

hol-ds the majority of

the responsj-bility in creating such a radical group, the
Peruvian government aided in more ways than just
aforementioned ones. Initially,

the government did not

even

recoqnize the Shining Path, blaming the attacks on smal-l
insurgencj-es that would die out quickly. When the Peruvian
1r
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government captured Guzman, they stopped searching for any

other members, because they believed that by cutting off
the head, the body woul-d die.1a In both instances, the
government underestimated the Shining Path, and Guzman used

this to further show that the government was too busy to
worry about anything that involved the lower cl-ass. In
1990, Alberto Fujimori became dictator of Peru, and
immediateJ-y went

after the Shining Path. Although he did

succeed in capturj-nq Guzman, Euji-mori al-so plundered the

nation of its wealth, taking copious amounts of Peru's
money

for himself and his friends. This crippled the

economy, and led to infighting in the government and

policing aqencies that were assigned to hunt down the
remaini-ng Shining Path members.ls Today, the Peruvian

government, under the Toledo administration continues to

alienate the lower classes, putting the military in charge
of the majority of Peru's 24 regions, and

sometimes

resortj-ng to viol-ence to stop laborers from striking. Both
To1edo and Euj imori

also declared that the Shining Path was

dead, and that terrorj-sm was no longer present in Perur 16
even thouqh it is clearly evident.

Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru." SmaLf
& Insurgencles. Vol 14 lssue 3 (Autumn2003): 191.
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Even

without the figurehead of the movement, the

Shining Path remains an entity that can still

strike fear

into the hearts of Peruvian ci-tizens and especially its
government. Abimael Guzman, with his openly Maoist and

Marxist beliefs, went from being a smal1 college philosophy
professor to a leader and demi-god in one of the most

radical and violent groups in the history of Peru. Although
the Peruvian government still- claj-ms that the Shini-ng Path
is done for good, there remains a small following that wiII
continue to bel-ieve in the Gonza1o Thought, and if the
government continues to act towards poverty and the less

fortunate the way that it has been, it is without question
that the

movement

Guzman. Although

wiII rise again, with or without Abimael

the Peruvian government did not create the

Shining Path, it enabl-ed such a viol-ent group, whether it
was through corruption, passivity, or simply because they
wou1d

not address the needs of the working class. Karl-

Marx

once said that a revolution would occur as soon as the

lower class got tired of being misrepresented and taken
advantage of by the ruling class, and i-n Peru, the Shining

Path exemplifies his belief.

-t
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